T his ar ti cle ex am ines the eco nomic con se quences of Jap a nese co lo nial ism in Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria in the years 1910 to 1945 and to com pare Jap a nese pol i cies with those implemented by other Eu ro pean pow ers, es pe cially in Southeast Asia. In par tic u lar it ad dresses the writ ings of an in flu en tial group of Amer i can schol ars, sev eral based at Stanford University, who have published widely on Jap a nese co lo nial pol i cies over the last fifty years. They con trib uted to sev eral edited vol umes and also authored a num ber of jour nal ar ti cles ex am in ing the eco nomic con se quences of Jap a nese co lo nial ism in Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria, as well as ex am in ing Japan's in for mal em pire in Asia. These writ ers were not for the most part Jap a nese, al though many had a deep knowl edge of Jap a nese lan guage as well as Western sources. To some ex tent, they were reacting against the work of Jap a nese schol ars writ ing af ter 1945, who tended to be crit i cal of as pects of Jap a nese co lo nial ism.
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By the 1980s, when rapid eco nomic growth in both Taiwan and the Republic of (South) Korea was attracting at ten tion from around the world, these schol ars stressed the more pos i tive as pects of the Jap a nese leg a cy, in clud ing the ag ri cul tural trans for ma tion and es pe cially the suc cess ful trans fer of higher yield ing rice va ri e ties, as well as the de vel op ment of in dus try and trans port in fra struc ture. They also discussed the Jap a nese em pha sis on expanding ac cess to ed u ca tion. Gradually, this work has been used to sup port a "new or tho doxy," which has stressed Jap a nese co lo nial ex cep tion al ism. This or tho doxy has been prop a gated by schol ars who are not them selves au thor i ties on Asian eco nomic de vel op ment. For ex am ple, Da vid Landes ar gued that "the best co lo nial mas ter of all time has been Japan, for no excol o nies have done so well as (South) Korea and Taiwan." The as sump tion of Landes, and in deed other writ ers who are bet ter known au thor i ties on the eco nomic his tory of Asia, is that the stel lar per for mance of these two econ o mies since 1960 must be due, in part at least, to the Jap a nese leg a cy. 2 There are some ob vi ous crit i cisms of such ar gu ments. One is that North Korea and Manchuria, which accounted for around 70 per cent of the to tal pop u la tion of Jap a nese col o nies in 1938, have not performed nearly as well as Taiwan and South Korea (Republic of Korea) in the sec ond half of the twen ti eth cen tu ry. While it is true that the three Man churian prov inces still had a higher per cap ita GDP than the av er age for the rest of China in the early years of the twen tyfirst cen tu ry, they had not achieved the level of de vel op ment of Taiwan or the Republic of Korea. North Korea, now ruled by the third gen er a tion of the Kim fam i ly, has be come a de vel op ment di sas ter. So Jap a nese "de vel op men tal co lo nial ism" seems to have left a much more pos i tive leg acy in some parts of the for mer Jap a nese em pire than in oth ers. Another prob lem is that much of the writ ing by main stream econ o mists on the eco nomic mir a cle in both Taiwan and Republic of Korea has taken the 1960s as the starting point. It ig nores the very dif fi cult de cades from the late 1930s to the late 1950s, when there were steep de clines in real GDP, and a slow re cov ery. According to re cent es ti ma tes, Taiwan regained the 1938 level of per cap ita GDP only in 1962. The Republic of Korea had a lower per cap ita GDP than Taiwan in the late 1930s and regained the 1938 level by 1953, al though the ab so lute level was be low Taiwan, and growth through the rest of the 1950s was not very fast. 3 Arguably, the growth mir a cles that oc curred post1960 in both countries were influ enced more by the pol icy re sponses to the prob lems of the late 1940s and 1950s than by the pe riod of Jap a nese con trol. A fur ther rea son for re vis ing the writ ing on Jap a nese co lo nial ism is that it does not en gage with the rap idly grow ing lit er a ture on co lo nial ism in other parts of Asia, or does so only in a very su per fi cial way. A com mon as sump tion seems to be that Brit ish, Dutch, French, and Amer i can co lo nial re gimes in Asia did not pro mote eco nomic growth and struc tural di ver si fi ca tion, left be hind in sti tu tions that were ex trac tive rather than in clu sive, and did very lit tle to im prove liv ing stan dards. This ar ti cle chal lenges these views by ex am in ing the ev i dence on eco nomic growth and struc tural change in the ma jor col o nies of East and Southeast Asia. It also looks at the role of gov ern ment, the emer gence of in dig e nous en tre pre neurs, and changes in ed u ca tion and liv ing stan dards. Finally the ar ti cle asks whether the Jap a nese col o nies were more prof it able to the met ro pol i tan econ omy than those in other parts of Asia.
Growth and Structural Change in Asia: 1900-1940
In 1913, the es ti ma tes given by the Maddison Project show that per cap ita GDP in co lo nial Asia (in 1990 in ter na tional dol lars) var ied from $673 in In dia to $988 in the Philippines and $1,367 in Singapore. 4 There was con sid er able var i a tion in growth rates be tween 1913 and 1941. In per cap ita terms, growth was pos i tive be tween 1913 and 1929 in most parts of co lo nial Asia, with Taiwan hav ing the fastest growth and In dia the slowest. Ko rean growth un til 1929 was no faster than in the Philippines, and not much dif fer ent from that of Burma or Indone sia ( Table 1) . After 1929, there was a more ob vi ous di ver gence be tween Korea and Manchuria com pared with other parts of co lo nial Asia. All the Eu ro pean col o nies in Asia and the Philippines ex pe ri enced a fall in per cap ita GDP be tween 1929 and 1934, al though there was some aims of the pro ject, see J. Bolt and J. L.van Zanden, "The Madison Project: Collaborative Research on Historical National Accounts," Economic History Review 67 (2014): 627-51.
4 http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddisonproject/home.htm, 2013 ver sion. Singapore did not ex ist as a sep a rate en tity in the 1930s; it was part of the larger ter ri tory known as the Straits Settlements, which in turn was one com po nent of Brit ish Malaya. Estimates of na tional in come for Singapore alone from 1900 to 2000 are given in Ichiro Sugimoto, Economic Growth of Singapore in the Twentieth Century: Historical GDP Estimates and Empirical Investigations (Singapore: World Scientific, 2011). re cov ery in Indonesia and the Philippines af ter 1934. Taiwan ex pe ri enced lit tle growth in per cap ita terms over the 1930s. Manchuria, which had be come the state of Manchukuo in 1932, un der strict Jap a nese con trol, suf fered a se vere eco nomic down turn in 1934. This was in part the re sult of the change of re gime, al though Kang Chao ar gued that the main rea son for the poor per for mance was that Manchuria had fallen into a sta ple trap when the world mar ket for its main ex port crop, soy beans, col lapsed af ter 1930.
5 Both pro duc tion and ex ports fell sharp ly. 6 The Jap a nese re sponse was to im ple ment a pol icy of eco nomic di ver si fi ca tion into min ing and in dus try. This was also their strat egy in both Korea and Taiwan. The re sult was ac cel er ated eco nomic growth af ter 1934, es pe cially in Korea, but also in Manchu ria. In Taiwan, per cap ita GDP reached a peak in 1938. But af ter that there was a de cline, and by 1940, per cap ita GDP was about the same as the 1929 es ti ma te. In Brit ish In dia, per cap ita GDP in 1940 was still be low the 1929 lev el, al though in both Indonesia and the Philippines the es ti ma tes for 1940 was above those for 1929. Perhaps the most sur pris ing re sult of all was from in de pen dent Thailand, where there was vir tu ally no growth in per cap ita terms be tween 1913 and 1938. What ex plains the bet ter growth per for mance in the Jap a nese col o nies, es pe cially in Korea and Manchuria, over the 1930s? The main rea son is that their trade and in vest ment were tightly linked to the Jap a nese econ o my, which ex pe ri enced faster growth dur ing the 1930s com pared with the ma jor econ o mies in West Europe and America. During the 1930s the Jap a nese col o nies con tin ued to in vest in both in fra struc ture (es pe cially trans port) and di rectly pro duc tive ac tiv i ties, in clud ing ag ri cul ture, min ing, and manufactur ing. By 1938, gross do mes tic cap i tal for ma tion in Manchuria was 23.5 per cent of GDP, al though the pro por tion was lower in Taiwan and Korea. 8 In all parts of the Jap a nese em pire, gov ern ment played a key role in pro mot ing in vest ment in both in fra struc ture and in pro duc tive ac tiv i ties, of fer ing con sid er able sta ple crop was an im por tant rea son for the wide spread pov erty in Manchuria even be fore prices fell in the 1930s; see his "Jap a nese Imperialism and Manchuria 1890-1931" (PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 1971), 178. But it is also prob a ble that the mon e tary cri sis in China in the early 1930s, which was caused by the fall in the in ter na tional price of sil ver, had some im pact on Manchuria and led to the full in te gra tion of Manchuria into the yen bloc. subsidies to the pri vate sec tor. Comparative data show that length of roads and rail ways in re la tion to area were higher in Taiwan and Korea than in any of the Southeast Asian col o nies ex cept Java.
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While Dutch, French, Brit ish, and Amer i can co lo nial ad min is tra tions were all aware of the im por tance of in vest ment in in fra struc ture, gov ern ment in vest ment was constrained by con ser va tive fis cal pol i cies, es pe cially af ter 1930. Over the 1930s, the world slump had an ad verse im pact on ex port rev e nues, which in turn af fected gov ern ment rev e nues. In Indonesia, gov ern ment spend ing on pub lic works, in clud ing ir ri ga tion, har bor works, trans port, and rail ways, reached a peak in real terms in 1921, and fell there af ter. In the 1930s spend ing on new pro jects was neg li gi ble.
10 But in spite of these cut backs, in 1938 road and rail den si ties in Java com pared fa vor ably with those in Taiwan and Korea, al though out side Java there was much less de vel op ment, with the ex cep tion of those re gions where there were ag ri cul tural es tates or largescale min ing op er a tions. In Manchuria, a rail sys tem had been de vel oped by the Rus sians and taken over by the Jap a nese early in the twen ti eth cen tu ry. The Jap a nese also de vel oped a road sys tem, al though by the late 1930s, the road den sity (thir tysix ki lo me ters per thou sand square ki lo me ters) was about the same as in Indochina, and less than in Burma or the Philippines. Investment in elec tric ity gen er a tion in Southeast Asia was left to the pri vate sec tor, and, with the ex cep tion of Brit ish Malaya, in stalled ca pac ity was much lower in the Southeast Asian col o nies than in Taiwan and Korea. 11 In the Jap a nese col o nies links be tween the gov ern ment and pri vate in ves tors were much tighter, to the ex tent that it was of ten dif fi cult to dis en tan gle pub lic and pri vate ini tia tives.
As would be expected, the eco nomic growth that oc curred across most of co lo nial Asia from 1913 to 1940 led to some struc tural change in the com po si tion of both out put and em ploy ment. The share of ag ri cul ture fell as a per cent age of to tal out put, while that of in dus try (min ing, manufactur ing, con struc tion, and util i ties) in creased. The sharpest fall in the share of ag ri cul ture oc curred in Korea and Manchuria, while in the Philippines and Thailand there was lit tle change ( Table 2) . The de cline in the share of ag ri cul ture in the Jap a nese col o nies was ac com pa nied by an in crease in the share of the in dus trial sec tor; by 1938 in dus try accounted for around 28 per cent of to tal GDP in Korea, 24 per cent in Taiwan, and 20 per cent in Korea (Table 3) . Industry accounted for around 20 per cent of to tal GDP in the Philippines, but a lower pro por tion in Indonesia, In dia and Thailand. The rea son for these out comes will be discussed fur ther be low.
What im pact did the growth of out put in the var i ous col o nies have on pat terns of em ploy ment? By the late 1930s, the avail able da ta, mainly from pop u la tion censuses, showed that around 25 per cent of the la bor force was employed out side ag ri cul ture in Korea and Manchuria, and 36 per cent in Taiwan. In the Philippines, the 1939 Population Cen sus showed that 31 per cent of the work ing pop u la tion was employed out side ag ri cul ture. 12 Population censuses held in Burma in 1931 and in Indonesia in 1930 both found that around 30 per cent were employed out side ag ri cul ture; this pro por tion prob a bly in creased over the 1930s. In Brit ish Malaya, the 1931 census found that the per cent age was close to for ty. 13 In all these col o nies, the ma jor ity of work ers employed out side 12 The 1939 la bor force data for the Philippines in cluded work ers in do mes tic and per sonal ser vices, such as house keep ers and house wives. As these work ers were not in cluded in other censuses car ried out in the 1930s, the Philippine cen sus is not strictly com pa ra ble. The in clu sion of do mes tic work ers has more im pact on the fe male la borforce da ta; the male data show that 29 per cent of work ers were in non ag ri cul tural oc cu pa tions. ag ri cul ture were in whole sale and re tail trade and other ser vices, with a smaller pro por tion in manufactur ing in dus try, con struc tion, and min ing. But grow ing num bers were also employed in gov ern ment ad min is tra tion and the pro fes sions. By the 1930s, in dig e nous work ers com prised the great ma jor ity of those employed in gov ern ment and the pro fes sions in the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Burma. The per cent age was lower in Taiwan and Korea, where Jap a nese work ers were more nu mer ous.
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Growth of Agriculture and Industry
Most stud ies of ag ri cul tural de vel op ment in both Taiwan and Korea in the de cades from 1910 to 1940 have stressed the suc cess ful trans fer of Jap a nese highyield ing rice va ri e ties, al though in both col o nies the pe riod of ac cel er ated ag ri cul tural growth was quite short. Tenghui Lee and Yueheh Chen found that there were three dis tinct phases of growth in Taiwanese ag ri cul ture dur ing the Jap a nese era. In the first, from 1913 to 1923, growth in gross value added in ag ri cul ture was quite mod est at 1.9 per cent per an num; in these years, ex pan sion of cul ti vated area was the main fac tor con trib ut ing to the growth in out put. The sec ond phase, from 1923 to 1937, was marked by ac cel er ated growth in out put and value added to around 4 per cent per an num, which resulted from both growth in yield and fur ther growth in cul ti vated ar ea. This was the pe riod when pro duc tion of the ponlai rice va ri ety took off, mainly for ex port to the Jap a nese mar ket. 15 Sugar pro duc tion, en tirely for the Jap a nese mar ket, also grew rap id ly. The third phase from 1937 to 1945 saw a de cline in out put as a re sult of bad weather and war time dis lo ca tion, which meant that Japan could no lon ger sup ply cru cial in puts such as fer til iz er. It also be came in creas ingly dif fi cult to trans port rice, sug ar, and other prod ucts to the Jap a nese mar ket.
Sung Hwan Ban also dis tin guished three phases in the growth of ag ri cul tural out put in Korea. During the 1920s, growth in ag ri cul tural out put was slow; gross value added grew at only around 0.3 per cent per 14 Comparative data on non ag ri cul tural em ploy ment in Jap a nese and other col o nies in the 1930s is given in Booth, Colonial Legacies, 127.
15 Tenghui Lee and Yueheh Chen, "Agricultural Growth in Taiwan, 1911 Taiwan, -1972 an num. Jap a nese at tempts to in crease rice pro duc tion were plagued by prob lems, in clud ing farmer re sis tance. Output growth did in crease over the 1930s, to 2.9 per cent per an num, mainly as a re sult of in creas ing fer til izer ap pli ca tion in rice pro duc tion, to gether with the dis sem i na tion of higher yield ing va ri e ties. The per cent age of rice land un der ir ri ga tion also in creased, per mit ting more dou ble crop ping. From 1930 to 1939, gross value added grew at around 2.6 per cent per an num. But as in Taiwan, ag ri cul tural growth was neg a tive in the years from 1939 to 1945. The rea sons were sim i lar: Less fer til izer was avail able to Ko rean farm ers, and mar ket ing chan nels were bro ken as trans port to and from main land Japan be came in creas ingly disrupted. 16 In Manchuria, gross value added in ag ri cul ture fell steeply be tween 1929 and 1934, mainly be cause of the col lapse in world mar kets for soy bean. Ramon Myers ar gued that from 1932 to 1937, Jap a nese ag ri cul tural pol icy in Manchuria was "vague," with lit tle at tempt to grap ple with the ru ral de pres sion. Cadastral sur veys were car ried out, mainly to fa cil i tate the implementation of a land tax. An im por tant con cern of the Jap a nese gov ern ment af ter 1932 was to set tle large num bers of Jap a nese farm ers to gether with sol diers re tir ing from the Kwantung Army on land in Manchuria. But Jap a nese were re luc tant to move, and the tar gets were never achieved. 17 With the implementation of the five year plan in 1937, ag ri cul tural pol icy be came more ac tiv ist, and gov ern ment con trols over pric ing more per va sive.
By 1939 Lasker states that in 1936 the Jap a nese gov ern ment planned to set tle 100,000 fam i lies (around 500,000 peo ple) in Manchuria, but by 1943 only around 57,000 house holds had ac tu ally moved. There were also over 100,000 youth vol un teer and other work ers, but how many were in volved in ag ri cul ture is un clear. In some dis tricts, both Chi nese and Ko rean farm ers were evicted from their land in or der to give it to Jap a nese set tlers, and lit tle or no com pen sa tion was paid. See S. Yamamuro, Manchuria un der Jap a nese Domation (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 202-6, and Nish, The History of Manchuria, 190. cul ti va tion ex pand ed, but yields per hect are fell, suggesting dimin ishing returns. 18 In Southeast Asia, the forces driv ing ag ri cul tural growth af ter 1900 were dif fer ent from those in the Jap a nese col o nies. Especially af ter 1918, Jap a nese pol icy in both Korea and Taiwan em pha sized food self suf fi ciency within the em pire; in prac tice this meant in creased pro duc tion of rice, sug ar, and other crops for ship ment to the Jap a nese mar ket. In Southeast Asia, ag ri cul tural pro duc tion was de ter mined to a much greater ex tent by global mar ket de mand. Rice ex ports from the three del tas (South Vietnam, Central Thailand, and Southern Burma) grew rap idly af ter 1870.
19 Most of these ex ports went to ricedef i cit parts of Asia, in clud ing east ern and south ern In dia, Brit ish Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines. In Indonesia and Brit ish Malaya new sta ples such as rub ber and palm oil were cul ti vated on large es tates and exported to both Eu ro pean and Amer i can mar kets. Smallholder pro duc tion of rub ber also in creased in the 1920s, es pe cially in Indonesia, where small holder pro duc tion of other ex port crops such as cof fee, pep per, and spices also grew. In the Philippines pro duc tion of sugar and trop i cal fruits de vel oped rap id ly, mainly ori ented to the Amer i can mar ket. Much of the growth in out put of ex port crops across Southeast Asia came from bring ing more land un der cul ti va tion, al though large es tates invested in re search into higher yield ing va ri e ties of both sugar and rub ber. In some parts of Southeast Asia, no ta bly Java, there was sub stan tial gov ern ment in vest ment in ir ri ga tion sys tems, which led to an in crease in dou blecrop ping, but lit tle change in yields. By the 1930s, the dou ble crop ping ra tio on rice land in Java was es ti mated to be around 1.4.
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In their anal y sis of ag ri cul tural out put growth in the Philippines, C. C. Da vid and Randolph Barker found that Philippine ag ri cul tural out put (in 1938 prices) grew at around 4 per cent per an num be tween 1902 and 1938.
21 This would ap pear to be much faster than in ei ther Taiwan or Korea. But when the data are bro ken into two sub pe ri ods, 18 On ag ri cul tural out put and area ex pan sion, as well as ag ri cul tural pol i cy, 1902-1918 and 1918-1938 , there was a very sharp de cline in the growth rate (from 7 per cent per an num to 1.1 per cent per an num). The very rapid growth in the ear lier pe riod was from a very low base. The avail able ev i dence sug gests that ag ri cul tural out put in the early 1900s was lower than in the 1890s be cause of drought, cat tle dis ease, and the im pact of the PhilippineAmer i can War. After 1918, Da vid and Randolph's es ti ma tes show fall ing land and la bor pro duc tiv i ty, which persisted un til 1938.
In both Thailand and Indonesia, the na tional ac counts data pre pared by Sompop Manarungsan and Pierre van der Eng both show that value added in the ag ri cul tural sec tor grew at around 2 per cent per an num be tween 1900 and the late 1930s. Unlike in the Philippines, there does not seem to have been a marked slow down af ter 1918; in Thailand growth over the 1930s was ac tu ally higher than in the 1900-1938 pe riod as a whole. In Indonesia there was also an ac cel er a tion in ag ri cul tural growth, to slightly over 2 per cent per an num af ter 1920. In Burma, the data on value added in ag ri cul ture as sem bled by Aye Hlaing show an in creas ing trend from 1901/1902 to 1931/1932, al beit with fluc tu a tions. The 1930s saw a de cline in value added of around 3.1 per cent per an num. Although world prices of most ex port sta ples fell af ter 1918, pro duc tion con tin ued to in crease in most parts of Southeast Asia un til the late 1920s, and in some cases into the 1930s. Smallholders proved to be more re sil ient in the face of ad verse in ter na tional mar ket trends than large es tates and gained a greater mar ket share for crops such as rub ber.
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To sum up, the ev i dence in di cates that there was con sid er able var i a tion in the Jap a nese col o nies and in Southeast Asia in ag ri cul tural per for mance in the first four de cades of the twen ti eth cen tu ry. While out put growth in Taiwan was faster than in most other re gions, the per for mance of both Manchuria and Korea was less im pres sive. Ramon Myers and Saburo Yamada ar gue that Taiwan benefited from an ear lier start in the adop tion of the Meiji agrar ian strat e gy, to gether with large in vest ments in ag ri cul ture. They stress the pos i tive im pact of greater mar ket ex change within the col ony and greater trade with Japan. But they also drew at ten tion to "two dys func tions, eco nomic in char ac 22 For data on the na tional ac counts of Thailand, Indonesia, and Burma, see Sompop ter," which af fected all ar eas of ru ral life in both Taiwan and Korea. The first was the un equal dis tri bu tion of wealth and in come in ru ral ar eas, which resulted from the very un equal dis tri bu tion of land, while the sec ond was the low in come and pur chas ing power of ru ral pop u la tions. 23 These prob lems were not unique to the Jap a nese col o nies; their im pact on liv ing stan dards will be discussed fur ther be low.
One con se quence of the sustained growth in ag ri cul tural out put in most col o nies in East and Southeast Asia in the early de cades of the twen ti eth cen tury was the rapid growth of ag ri cul tural processing in dus tries. Rice mill ing was im por tant al most ev ery where, as was saw mill ing; these two in dus tries dom i nated manufactur ing out put in Thai land and Burma. In Java and the Philippines, the role of sugar re fin ing in creased from the late nineteenth cen tury on ward. The processing of nat u ral rub ber into a form that could be exported to the United States and Europe also be came im por tant in both Brit ish Malaya and Indo nesia. By 1925, Singapore had be come the main port for the pro cessing and on ward ship ment of rub ber from both Brit ish Malaya and Indonesia. 24 In Taiwan, food processing accounted for 70 per cent of manufactur ing out put in 1914-1916, and in spite of some at tempt at di ver si fi ca tion, the share of food processing in creased to 73 per cent in 1938-1940. In Manchuria, the processing of soy bean dom i nated manufactur ing un til the de cline in out put and ex ports in the 1930s.
During the 1930s, there was a rapid ac cel er a tion in in dus trial growth, and par tic u larly in manufactur ing growth, in both Korea and Manchuria, while in Taiwan the growth of min ing and manufactur ing slowed af ter 1927. 25 In Korea the growth in manufactur ing was from a very low base; as late as 1929, the in dus trial sec tor (min ing, manufactur ing, con struc tion, and util i ties) accounted for around 12 Princeton University Press, 1984), 366. From the mid1930s, Jap a nese strat egy was to pro mote in dus tri al i za tion in Taiwan through processing raw ma te ri als from China and Southeast Asia. Bauxite from Indonesia was to be processed us ing elec tric ity from the newly constructed fa cil ity at SunMoon Lake. But war time trans port prob lems prevented most of these schemes from com ing to fru ition. per cent of GDP, which was low in com par i son with most other Asian col o nies (Table 3) . Some schol ars have ar gued that it was de lib er ate Jap a nese pol icy to keep in dus tri al i za tion to a min i mum in this pe riod so that Korea would re main a mar ket for Jap a nese prod ucts. The growth dur ing the 1930s was based on ag ri cul tural processing only to a lim ited ex tent; es pe cially in the north, the fastgrow ing sec tors were wood prod ucts, chemicals, ce ram ics, and ma chin ery. By 1938-1940, al most 62 per cent of to tal manufactur ing out put in the north came from chem icals and a fur ther 17 per cent from met als, ma chin ery, and ce ram ics. 26 Most of the in vest ment in the mod ern fac tory sec tor in Korea came from Japan. It has been es ti mated that 94 per cent of paidup cap i tal in the Ko rean fac tory sec tor was owned by Jap a nese in ter ests in 1940. 27 In sec tors such as elec tric i ty, gas, and ce ram ics, Jap a nese firms accounted for 100 per cent of paidup cap i tal. Many of the Jap a nese firms were owned by large Jap a nese con glom er ates (zaibatsu), which were of ten given mo nop o lies in par tic u lar sec tors. These firms were closely tied to the Jap a nese gov ern ment and pur sued the goals it set, which dur ing the 1930s were de ter mined by the mil i tary, rather than according to ci vil ian in ter ests. 28 As Japan con sol i dated its power in Manchuria and Jap a nese strat egy be came more ori ented to build ing an em pire stretching across north east ern Asia, the goals of Jap a nese pol icy in Korea be came more tightly linked to de vel op ment needs in Manchuria. Korea was viewed as a base for ad vance into the whole of North Asia. This had im por tant con se quences for Ko rean busi ness ven tures in Manchuria and for Ko rean mi gra tion, which will be con sid ered fur ther be low. 29 Between 1934 and 1941, the growth of the mod ern fac tory sec tor in Manchuria was re mark ably rapid at al most 20 per cent per an num in 26 On Jap a nese pol i cies to wards Ko rean in dus trial growth, see Kwang Suk Kim, "An Analysis of Economic Change in Korea," in Korea un der Jap a nese Colonial Rule, ed. Andrew C. Nahm (Kalamazoo: Center for Ko rean Studies, Western Michigan University, 1973), 103. For data on out put growth in in dus try, see T. Mizoguchi, "Economic Growth of Korea un der the Jap a nese Occupation-Background of Industrialization of Korea. real terms. The whole in dus trial sec tor grew more slow ly, at al most 9 per cent per an num, but this was still a very fast rate in com par i son with most other parts of the world at that time. By 1941, min ing, manufactur ing in dus try, and con struc tion accounted for 20.3 per cent of GDP ( Table 3) . The role of heavy in dus try be came more im por tant: In 1938, metal in dus tries, ma chin ery, chemicals, elec tric i ty, and gas accounted for 69 per cent of paidup cap i tal in the manufactur ing sec tor to sus tain Japan's war in Asia. The Jap a nese gov ern ment, now run ning a war econ o my, had am bi tious plans for the fur ther de vel op ment of Man churia's in dus trial ca pac ity af ter 1942, when the sec ond fiveyear plan was ini ti at ed. 30 Output of steel, pig iron, and iron ore was to be nearly dou bled by 1946. Further de vel op ment of hy dro elec tric i ty, coal, and shale oil was also planned. Had these tar gets been achieved, Manchuria would have had a more de vel oped in dus trial sec tor than any other part of Asia, with the ex cep tion of Japan itself. But the Soviet Army's in va sion of Manchuria in 1945 led to mas sive falls in in dus trial out put, from which the econ omy was slow to re cov er. Kungtu Sun quotes an Amer i can es ti mate that val ued the loss of plants at al most $1 bil li on. This was con firmed by a Jap a nese es ti ma te.
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The very rapid de vel op ment of in dus try in both Korea and Manchu ria un til the early 1940s can be contrasted not just with Taiwan, but also with most col o nies in Southeast Asia. It was only in the 1930s that the Dutch be gan to en cour age the growth of largescale manufactur ing through for eign in vest ment in sec tors in clud ing au to mo biles, rub ber tires and tubes, soaps and cos met ics, bat te ries, cig a rettes, electrical ap pli ances, and brewing. A mea sure of pro tec tion was granted to the do mes tic tex tile sec tor, mainly by plac ing quo tas on Jap a nese im ports, and en cour age ment was given to smallscale weav ing through the dis tri bu tion of im proved handlooms. 32 The processing of crude pe tro leum into a num ber of re fined prod ucts also grew rap id ly. By 1941, the in dus trial sec tor accounted for 17.6 per cent of GDP (Table 3) . Jack Shepherd ar gued that the se vere im pact of the world de pres sion forced co lo nial au thor i ties to take in dus trial pol icy more se ri ously in both Indonesia and Viet nam, whereas in the Philippines, ex port pro duc ers had the ad van tage of pref er en tial ac cess to the Amer i can mar ket. 33 This helped pro duc ers of sug ar, veg e ta ble oils, and other processed ag ri cul tural prod ucts, in the same way that rice and sugar pro duc ers in Taiwan were assisted by ac cess to the Jap a nese mar ket. The pol icy in the Philippines meant that any se ri ous dis cus sion of in dus trial pol icy was de ferred un til af ter 1945. In Brit ish Malaya, the pow er ful planter lobby resisted Brit ish plans to re strict im ports of tex tile goods from Japan; they needed to hold down wage costs, and cheap im ports of food and tex tiles were cru cial. They did not much care where the im ports came from, and in deed were in censed that "the low paid Asi atic is to be taxed in the in ter ests of the Lan ca shire man u fac tur er."
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Government Policies and the Development of the Private Sector
By the first de cade of the twen ti eth cen tu ry, all the co lo nial pow ers in East and Southeast Asia, were try ing to es tab lish ef fec tive ad min is tra tive struc tures that pri or i tized the cen tral i za tion and re form of fis cal sys tems. But there were con sid er able dif fer ences in out comes of rev e nue pol i cies in dif fer ent parts of co lo nial Asia. Government rev e nues per cap ita in 1910 var ied be tween ap prox i ma tely one dol lar in Vietnam to about fif teen dol lars in the Federated Malay States. 35 Although sev eral of the col o nies with low rev e nues per cap ita in 1910 im proved their rev e nue per for mance over the next two de cades, none caught up 32 
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These dif fer ences in rev e nue per for mance can be explained partly by dif fer ences in tax able ca pac i ty, as proxied by per cap ita GDP, and partly by a re luc tance on the part of sev eral co lo nial re gimes to in crease taxes on the in dig e nous pop u la tions for fear of pro vok ing un rest. A fre quent crit i cism of co lo nial rev e nue sys tems in Asia was that they were re gres sive, in the sense that their in ci dence fell more heavily on in dig e nous pop u la tions than on for eign com pa nies and in di vid u als. Critics pointed to the high re li ance on land tax es, ex cises, and ex port and im port duties. Income taxes on both cor po ra tions and in di vid u als were ei ther not assessed at all , as in Brit ish Malaya, or assessed at low rates with many ex emp tions. Nontax rev e nues, in clud ing those from opi um, to bac co, and al co hol mo nop o lies, were also con sid ered re gres sive. These accounted for at least onethird of all gov ern ment rev e nues in most Asian col o nies in the late 1930s, in clud ing Taiwan and Korea. Andrew Grajdanzev ar gued that 80 to 90 per cent of all taxes in Taiwan fell on the mass of the pop u la tion and only 10 per cent on the rel a tively wealthy, many of whom were Jap a nese. Mitsuhiko Kimura also ar gued that Jap a nese rev e nue pol i cies in Korea were re gres sive, and wealth ier peo ple, whether Jap a nese or Ko re an, es caped quite light ly.
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On the ex pen di ture side, all co lo nial gov ern ments in Asia had by 1913 be gun to as sume re spon si bil ity for a much broader range of ac tiv i ties than sim ply the main te nance of law and or der and the col lec tion of rev e nues. Atul Kohli de scribes the co lo nial state in Korea as a "busy state," which be came in creas ingly in volved in many de vel op men tal ac tiv i ties. 38 But this was true in Southeast Asia as well. Increasingly, it was rec og nized that am bi tious pro grams of infrastructural de vel op 36 Booth, Colonial Legacies, But in spite of the in creased em pha sis on in fra struc ture, there were marked dif fer ences in spend ing pri or i ties across co lo nial Asia. The com par a tive study car ried out by E. B. Schwulst showed that the per cent age of to tal bud get ary ex pen di tures on po lic ing and de fense var ied from over 30 per cent in the Netherlands Indies and Siam to only 8 per cent in the Philippines. 40 The per cent ages in both the Netherlands Indies and Siam were higher than in Taiwan and Korea in 1935 and 1936, re spec tively ( Table 4) . The per cent age of to tal ex pen di tures de voted to pub lic works and ag ri cul ture also var ied con sid er ably, al though it was lower in most Southeast Asian col o nies than in ei ther Taiwan or Korea. The per cent age on health and ed u ca tion was un der 15 per cent in most col o nies; the ex cep tions were the Philippines and the Federated Malay States. The for mer spent over a third of the bud get on health and ed u ca tion, and the lat ter around 20 per cent; else where the pro por tions were much low er. 41 In both Taiwan 41 One rea son for the em pha sis on health ex pen di tures in the Philippines was prob a bly a rec og ni tion that the gen eral health of the pop u la tion at the end of the Span ish era was low ca tion fell as a pro por tion of to tal ex pen di tures af ter 1920 and never exceeded 10 per cent of to tal ex pen di tures. 42 The out comes in terms of ed u ca tional and health in di ca tors in var i ous parts of co lo nial Asia will be ex am ined fur ther be low.
In Manchuria, gov ern ment rev e nues and ex pen di tures per cap ita in 1932 were lower than in ei ther Taiwan or Korea in terms of yen per cap i ta, al though they in creased rap idly af ter 1933 and by 1938, they had even by Asian stan dards. An anal y sis of the an thro po met ric ev i dence is given in JeanPascal Bassino, Marion Dovis, and John Komlos, "Biological WellBeing in the Late 19thCentury Philippines," NBER Working Paper 21410 (Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2015). This work ing pa per finds ev i dence of a de cline in heights in the years from the early 1870s to the late 1880s. Z. C. Zablan pres ents data on in fant mor tal ity rates which were very low in the early part of the twen ti eth cen tu ry, al though they in creased there af ter; Zablan, "Trends and Differentials in Mortality," Population of the Philippines: Country Monograph Series No. 5 (Bangkok: United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 1978), 100-105. 42 Booth, Colonial Legacies, al most caught up with Korea. 43 But they remained much lower than in Taiwan (Tables 5 and 6 ). The share of spend ing on de fense and po lic ing fell from over 40 per cent in 1932 to 27.5 per cent in 1935, which was lower than in ei ther Siam or the Netherlands Indies ( Table 4) . Much of the mil i tary ex pen di ture was for re gional pac i fi ca tion. Most of the rest of the gen eral ac count bud get was de voted to ad min is tra tive ex pen di tures; ex pen di tures on in fra struc ture were taken from the spe cial ac count and from other sources. Myers ar gued that de pen dence on the spe cial ac count to fi nance de vel op ment ex pen di tures con tin ued through out the pe riod of Jap a nese con trol of Manchuria, but af ter 1938 re li ance on debt to fund spe cial ac count ex pen di tures grew. 44 One of the most se vere crit i cisms of co lo nial pol i cies in many parts of the world is that co lo nial gov ern ments trapped the great ma jor ity of the pop u la tion in un pro duc tive ac tiv i ties, mainly in smallscale ag ri cul ture and in tra di tional manufactur ing and ser vices. This prevented the emer gence of in dig e nous en tre pre neurs, ca pa ble of man ag ing mod ern firms. In Southeast Asia, this ar gu ment be came entwined with the con cept of the plu ral econ o my, char ac ter ized by a marked di vi sion of la bor along eth nic lines. J. S. Furnivall ar gued that the plu ral econ omy char ac ter ized most parts of Southeast Asia by the early twen ti eth 43 Sun, Economic Development of Manchuria, 78, points out that his tor i cally pub lic fi nance in Manchuria had been decentralized; the Manchukuo gov ern ment was de ter mined to re form the sys tem. Kanai gives an ac count of the re forms un til 1935 from a Jap a nese per spec tive in Kiyoshi Kanai, Economic Development in Manchoukuo (Tokyo: Jap a nese Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1936), chap. 5. 44 Myers, Jap a nese Economic Development of Manchuria, 237-40. cen tu ry. 45 In sev eral Southeast Asian cit ies, mi grant Asians, mainly Chi nese and In di an, com prised a sig nif i cant share of the pop u la tion and accounted for the ma jor ity of work ers in manufactur ing, re tail trade, con struc tion, and trans port. In the Federated Malay States and in Indonesia out side Java, over 40 per cent of Chi nese work ers were in ag ri cul ture, mainly as es tate la bor ers, but else where the Chi nese tended to work in manufactur ing, com merce, trans port, and per sonal ser vices, with a small num ber in the pro fes sions. 46 As a broad gen er al iza tion, it was true that no co lo nial gov ern ment in Southeast Asia adopted pol i cies that fos tered the de vel op ment of an 46 Historians have contrasted Brit ish pol icy in Malaya with that of the Amer i cans in the Philippines af ter 1900. The Brit ish were concerned mainly with the stra te gic goals of main taining free dom of nav i ga tion through the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea; to this end, Singapore was de vel oped as an im por tant na val base and com mer cial entrepôt. The Malay states were seen as im por tant for the vi a bil ity of Singapore, but in dig e nous Malays had to be protected from mod ern cap i tal ism. A small num ber of Malay boys from elite fam i lies were given Brit ish ed u ca tion, but the rest were sup posed to re main in tra di tional oc cu pa tions. In the Philippines, the Amer i cans aimed to as sim i late Fil i pi nos into a mod ern state, re sem bling the Western states of the United States. In the words of one his to ri an, "The Amer i cans aimed to cul ti vate the Fil i pi nos in their own im age, while the Brit ish sought to con serve Malay so ci ety to al low Malays to grow at their own ra cial pa ce" (Dan iel P. S. in dig e nous en tre pre neur ial class, al though the ex pan sion of postpri mary ed u ca tion in the Philippines must have en cour aged many grad u ates to move into pro fes sional and ad min is tra tive oc cu pa tions. To a greater or lesser ex tent, many co lo nial of fi cials tended to view in dig e nous pop u la tions as lacking any tal ent for, or in ter est in, mod ern in dus try and com merce. Sometimes, this at ti tude manifested itself in out right rac ism. But other of fi cials, both Dutch and Brit ish, were aware that at least some of the crit i cisms made of the busi ness capacities of in dig e nous pop u la tions were un fair. Richard Windstedt, a prominent of fi cial in Brit ish Malaya, ar gued that be cause most Malays were in de pen dent farm ers with lit tle need to work for hire, they had ac quired an un der served rep u ta tion for idle ness. But Winstedt, like most other ad min is tra tors in Brit ish Malaya, thought that the pro vi sion of En glishlan guage ed u ca tion to Malays should be re strict ed, lest they be come rest less and for sake their tra di tional way of life for one that would in ev i ta bly lead to ex ploi ta tion and des ti tu tion. In Indonesia, Ja cob van Gelderen stressed that in dig e nous cul ti va tors were likely to be exploited in their deal ings with the mar ket econ omy be cause of the great dif fer ence in bargaining power be tween the buyer on the one hand and the seller on the oth er. 47 Paradoxically, in spite of Dutch con cerns about the abil ity of in dig e nous In do ne sians, and es pe cially the Ja va nese, to par tic i pate in the "mod ern econ o my," by 1930 in dig e nous work ers accounted for a higher pro por tion of the la bor force in both Java and the Outer Islands of Indonesia than in the Straits Settlements, the Federated Malay States, or Burma. The pro por tion was also higher than in Taiwan, about the same as Korea, and only slightly lower than in the Philippines. In Java, in dig e nous work ers accounted for a higher pro por tion of work ers in non ag ri cul tural oc cu pa tions than in any other col ony ex cept the Philippines. 48 Although it was prob a bly true that many jobs oc cu pied by in dig e nous Ja va nese re quired few skills (many were petty trad ers and homeworkers in cot tage in dus try), they also outnumbered the Chi nese and Eu ro pe ans in pro fes sional oc cu pa tions and in the civil ser vice. Even in trade, where the Chi nese were cer tainly im por tant, in dig e nous work ers com prised the ma jor ity of work ers both in Java and else where.
In Taiwan, Sam uel Paosan Ho claimed that the Jap a nese never en cour aged the emer gence of an in dig e nous busi ness class. In fact he 47 ar gued that the whole pol icy of the Jap a nese gov ern ment "was di rected to ward pre vent ing the emer gence of such as class." Until 1924, na tive Taiwanese were not allowed to or ga nize or operate cor po ra tions un less there was Jap a nese par tic i pa tion. As a re sult, the mod ern sec tor of the econ omy be came a mo nop oly of the Jap a nese cap i tal ists. 49 This changed lit tle un til 1945. In Korea, Dan iel Juhn pointed out that in the 1930s, when the Jap a nese au thor i ties were try ing to at tract the large Jap a nese in dus trial con glom er ates (zaibatsu) to in vest in Korea, some of fi cials did ar gue for a strat egy that would en cour age Ko rean small and me dium en ter prises. But there is lit tle ev i dence that Ko rean firms re ceived much en cour age ment. Neither did the ac tiv i ties of the Jap a neseestablished co op er a tives have any im pact, es pe cially when com pared with small pro duc ers' co op er a tives in Japan. 50 But in spite of unsupportive Jap a nese pol i cies, some Ko rean en ter prises did emerge and grow dur ing the co lo nial era. The out stand ing ex am ple of an in dig e nous Ko rean in dus trial fam ily that rose to wealth in the Jap a nese era was the Kim broth ers, who founded the Kyong song Spinning Company. They man aged to with stand com pe ti tion from bet terfunded Jap a nese firms, con sol i date their po si tion in Korea and move into south ern Manchuria. 51 Dennis McNamara ar gued that the founding of the spin ning fac tory in Manchuria was "a dra matic ex am ple of Kim's abil ity to gain ex ten sive Jap a nese sup port for a Ko reanowned and man aged in dus trial ven ture abroad." 52 Other Ko rean en ter prises were established in Manchuria, and Ko re ans also worked for both Jap a nese en ter prises and the Manchurian gov ern ment. Kohli ar gues that, al though much of the heavy in dus try was con cen trated in the north, the Jap a nese left be hind a "con sid er able den si ty" of en tre pre neur ship in the south, which fa cil i tated the post1950 de vel op ment of largescale manufactur ing. 53 Ko rean as well as Jap a nese mi grants moved to Manchuria; by 1939, there were 642,300 Jap a nese in Manchuria who oc cu pied se nior po si tions in gov ern ment and busi ness. 54 Official fig ures reported an other 1.16 mil lion Ko re ans, com pris ing 2.9 per cent of the lo cal pop u la tion. Ko re ans com prised the same per cent age of the pop u la tion in Manchuria as Jap a nese did in Korea. The Ko re ans worked mainly in in ter me di ate oc cu pa tions, while large num bers of mi grants from China moved mainly into un skilled la bor ing jobs. Indigenous Manchurians were employed mainly in ag ri cul ture, al though small num bers moved into other oc cu pa tions. Indeed, by the late 1930s, Manchuria was be gin ning to take on the char ac ter is tics of a plu ral econ omy in the Furnivall sense, where eth nic ity and oc cu pa tion were tightly linked. As Shin'ichi Yamamuro ar gues, in spite of the sub stan tial inmi gra tion, Manchuria was hardly an eth nic melt ing pot. The Jap a nese had lit tle or no con tact with the other eth nic groups and lived apart from them. 55 This was prob a bly also true of the other mi grant groups that did not have a com mon lan guage and would have found com mu ni ca tion with other mi grants or with the in dig e nous pop u la tion very dif fi cult.
Labour Migration and Labour Exploitation
By the early twen ti eth cen tu ry, large num bers of peo ple were on the move across Asia. Between 1881 and 1910, gross im mi gra tion to South east Asia from In dia and China has been es ti mated at around 3.7 mil li on, ris ing to 6.8 mil lion in 1911-1929. In the 1930s, num bers fell to 4.76 mil li on. From 1911 on ward, gross flows to Southeast Asia exceeded those to the United States by a con sid er able mar gin. 56 Net flows were much low er, be cause many of the mi grants returned home; in Brit ish Malaya net flows were neg a tive over the 1930s, al though in other parts of the re gion, they remained pos i tive. While most mi grants came to Southeast Asia with the aim of sav ing money and even tu ally return ing home, by the in ter war years many stayed and formed fam i lies in their host coun try. The de ci sion to set tle was the re sult of both ad verse con di tions at home and im prov ing op por tu ni ties for mi grant work ers in Southeast Asia. 57 But mi gra tion from China and In dia to Southeast Asia was only part of the story of pop u la tion move ment across Asia in the early de cades of the twen ti eth cen tu ry. Migration from the Chi nese main land to Taiwan was small com pared to the flows to Southeast Asia, al though Adam Schneider claimed that be tween 1905 and 1935, the num bers of Chi nese work ers in Taiwan grew from 4,000 to 40,000. After a pause in the late 1930s, la bor re cruit ment started again in 1940. 58 Many main land ers were ad mit ted for sea sonal work and had to go home af ter their con tracts ex pired. All Chi nese cit i zens in Taiwan were treated by the Jap a nese as for eign ers, and from 1905 on ward, their num bers were much lower than the num bers of Jap a nese on the island. Bruno Lasker es ti mated that by 1942, there were 310,000 Jap a nese in Taiwan, al though only a small pro por tion would have been en gaged in farm ing. A fur ther 1.4 mil lion were es ti mated to be in Korea and Manchuria. 59 Ko re ans were far more mo bile than Jap a nese, mov ing in large num bers both to main land Japan and to Manchuria in search of higher wages and bet ter con di tions than were avail able at home. By 1940, the num ber of Ko re ans liv ing out side Korea exceeded 2.5 mil li on, or about 10 per cent of the to tal pop u la tion in that year. 60 The great ma jor ity would have been in ei ther Japan or Manchuria. Most were unspon sored. Mineo Yamanaka and col leagues show that 1.36 mil lion Ko re ans and Taiwanese were liv ing in Manchuria by 1940; the num ber rose to 1.6 mil lion by 1942. Lasker stated that the 1939 cen sus in the Soviet Union found that over 180,000 Ko re ans were liv ing in the Soviet Far East. During the Pacific War, Ko rean la bor crews were found as far south as Papua New Guinea. 61 While Ko re ans were prob a bly the most mo bile of all the ma jor eth nic groups, rel a tive to their to tal pop u la tion, in co lo nial Asia, other eth nic groups were also on the move in search of em ploy ment op por tu ni ties. By the late 1930s, there were prob a bly around 1.5 mil lion eth nic Ja va nese liv ing out side Java. Of these, the ma jor ity were in other parts of Indonesia, par tic u larly Sumatra. Many had gone to work on the es tates in Eastern Sumatra as in den tured la bor ers; the 1930 cen sus found that 31.4 per cent of the in dig e nous pop u la tion on the East Coast di vi sion had been born in Java. Conditions on the es tates for mi grant work ers were of ten harsh, al though the Dutch co lo nial gov ern ment did in tro duce some mea sures to pro tect them as their num bers grew. 62 The same cen sus found that there were 1.14 mil lion peo ple from Ja va nese eth nic groups liv ing in other parts of Indonesia. Num bers of Ja va nese liv ing else where in the ar chi pel ago prob a bly in creased over the 1930s, not least be cause of the of fi cial gov ern ment set tle ment pol i cy, which moved fam i lies from Java over the course of the 1930s. 63 In ad di tion some 170,000 Ja va nese were reported in the 1931 cen sus to be liv ing in Brit ish Malaya.
In Manchuria, the Jap a nese con sid ered that eco nomic de vel op ment was held back by an acute short age of la bor, and gov ern ment pol icy in creas ingly en cour aged inmi gra tion from China. E. B. Schumpeter gives a time se ries from 1926 to 1938 show ing that ar riv als peaked at over one mil lion per year be tween 1927 and 1929 and fell there af ter, al though they sel dom dropped be low 500,000 un til 1938.
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As in Southeast Asia, net mi gra tion was low er, but only neg a tive in two years. From 1937 to 1941, mi grant work ers in the prime work ing age groups were recruited by Manchuriabased Jap a nese com pa nies and by the mil i tary, and their num bers grew rap idly over these years. The ac cu mu lated new entries from China proper to Manchuria from 1932 to 1945 were es ti mated to be close to nine mil li on. They played a key role in the min ing and con struc tion sec tors.
But la bor short ages did not push up the work ers' wages de spite ini tial prom ises made by the Jap a nese em ployers. Once in side Manchuria, these mi grant work ers were sub ject to sys tem atic co er cion and had lit tle pro tec tion. They were forced to live and work in harsh con di tions char ac ter ized by daily vi o lence, long work ing hours, in ad e quate hous ing, hun ger, and dis eases. In a sys tem atic in ves ti ga tion into large scale forced la bor un der Jap a nese rule in Manchuria, Li Binggang and col leagues es ti mated that life ex pec tancy among the Chi nese work ers who were pur posely recruited to work on Jap a nese pro jects in Man churia (mainly in the min ing and build ing sec tors) was only 1.3 years af ter en ter ing Manchuria. These were worse fig ures than for any other group of mi grants in co lo nial Asia. As a re sult, according to a Jap a nese re port of 1941, less than 20 per cent of the Chi nese work ers ever returned home alive. 65 
The Development of Education and Health Care and Changing Living Standards
The is sue of the treat ment of mi grant work ers has be come part of wider de bates about the pro vi sion of ed u ca tion and health fa cil i ties and about chang ing liv ing stan dards across co lo nial Asia. Some schol ars have ar gued that the Jap a nese placed more em pha sis on ed u ca tional de vel op ment than other co lo nial pow ers in Asia. Hideo Kobayashi claimed that "the most im me di ate post war leg acy of the Jap a nese co lo nial era was the ex is tence of the hun dreds of thou sands of ed u cated South Ko re ans and Taiwanese who be came the core of the post war po lit i cal and eco nomic elites." 66 Other stud ies have also em pha sized Jap a nese ed u ca tional pol i cies and contrasted them with much poorer out comes in other col o nies.
67 Does the ev i dence sup port such claims? The Jap a nese were quite suc cess ful in in creas ing school at ten dance in Taiwan at the pri mary lev el; by 1940, close to 60 per cent of schoolage chil dren attended pri mary school. But for the great ma jor ity of chil dren in Taiwan, their ed u ca tion ceased af ter the pri mary cy cle. Ten mid dle schools were lo cated in the main towns; they were open to most 65 Jap a nese, but only care fully se lected Taiwanese could at tend. 68 At the ter tiary level there were very few op por tu ni ties in Taiwan, al though a small num ber went to main land Japan. After Taiwan was returned to China in 1945, the "Jap a nese leg a cy" was sys tem at i cally re moved by the Republican Government in a cam paign of "deJapanisation" (qu ribenhua). All forms of Jap a nese po lit i cal, eco nom ic, and cul tural in flu ence were banned, and most Japantrained bu reau crats, mil i tary per son nel, and teach ers were re moved from of fice. As a re sult, what ever their skills and ex pe ri ence, they had lit tle in put in post1945 gov ern ment ad min is tra tion.
In Korea, the Jap a nese mod ern ized pri mary ed u ca tion, in tro duc ing sub jects such as ge og ra phy, arith me tic, and the Jap a nese lan guage. Primary en roll ment rates in creased to over 70 per cent for boys and 20 per cent for girls by 1940. 69 Many par ents objected to the new syl la bus, and some changes were made in the 1930s. Students of ten re belled against what was seen as in doc tri na tion to be come loyal sub jects of a for eign em per or. The use of the ed u ca tion sys tem to in cul cate Jap a nese val ues into Ko rean chil dren and turn them against Chris tian and other "Western be liefs" in ten si fied over the 1930s. 70 By 1939, 1.3 mil lion chil dren were en rolled in "short course el e men tary schools" al though num bers in mid dle and high schools were much low er. At the ter tiary lev el, it was es ti mated that in 1943, there were twen tyeight in sti tu tions of higher learn ing; eleven were gov ern mentrun and the rest pri vate. They en rolled 4,541 stu dents, but only 1,337 were Ko rean and the rest Jap a nese. Jongchol Kim ar gues that the Jap a nese at ti tude to higher ed u ca tion in Korea was that it was "some thing dan ger ous and su per flu ous." 71 This was, to a con sid er able ex tent, the at ti tude of most other co lo nial gov ern ments in Asia, with one im por tant ex cep tion, which will be discussed be low.
In Manchuria, the gov ern ment of Manchoukuo also prohibited the use of text books, which were con sid ered an tiJap a nese, but at the same time, they tried to mod ern ize the cur ric u lum, in tro duce vo ca tional train ing, and im prove the train ing of teach ers. There was a con sid er able ex pan sion in num bers of chil dren at tend ing school; as in Taiwan and Korea, most of this ex pan sion was at the pri mary lev el. Kiyoshi Kanai found that the great ma jor ity of chil dren en rolled in school were at the pri mary lev el, al though there was some growth in postpri mary en roll ments. 72 In 1939, 3,820 stu dents were en rolled in gov ern ment and pri vate higher ed u ca tion in sti tu tions; com pared with Korea, a higher pro por tion, around 67 per cent, were from Manchuria. A small num ber were sent to Japan for higher ed u ca tion. 73 In the late 1930s, only about 4.4 per cent of the Manchurian pop u la tion was en rolled in school-a lower pro por tion than in Korea and much lower than in Taiwan. But as E. Patricia Tsurumi ar gued, Jap a nese pol icy in all three col o nies was to rep li cate the "lower track of the twotrack Meiji ed u ca tion sys tem." Education for even tual selfgov ern ment was never part of Jap a nese co lo nial pol i cy.
74
This was also the case in the Eu ro pean col o nies, where co lo nial re gimes shared the Jap a nese re luc tance to ex pose the in dig e nous pop u la tions to any thing more than ba sic pri mary ed u ca tion. A par tial ex cep tion was Brit ish Malaya, where a num ber of schools were established by, and mainly for, the Chi nese pop u la tion, of ten supported by phi lan thro pists and churches. By the in ter war years, ter tiary ed u ca tion was avail able in Brit ish Malaya, Burma, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand, but only a very small num ber of stu dents en rolled. The ex cep tion was the Philippines; in 1940-1941 it was es ti mated that over two mil lion stu dents were en rolled in the pub lic school sys tem and a fur ther 180,000 in pri vate schools. Of these, around 40,000 were in postsec ond ary in sti tu tions, some of which were re li gious foun da tions and some, in clud ing the University of the Philippines, established by gov ern ment.
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The Amer i can em pha sis on ed u ca tion, es pe cially at the sec ond ary and ter tiary levels, reflected the in ten tion of suc ces sive Amer i can ad min is tra tions to grant selfgov ern ment and even tual in de pen dence to the Philippines. It was ar gued that a sub stan tial num ber of pro fes sion al, tech ni cal, and ad min is tra tive work ers would be re quired, and that the great ma jor ity would have to be ed u cated in the col o ny. Even so, Amer i can ed u ca tional pol icy was hardly an un qual i fied suc cess. Many chil dren, par tic u larly in the more re mote ru ral ar eas, ei ther did not en ter school at all or dropped out be fore finishing sixth grade. A com mis sion of en quiry in 1925 found that many clas ses were badly taught by teach ers with lit tle com mand of En glish. But in spite of the ob vi ous deficiencies of the sys tem, many bright young peo ple from rel a tively hum ble back grounds did man age to com plete sec ond ary and even ter tiary school ing and move into em ploy ment in gov ern ment ad min is tra tion or the pri vate sec tor. By the end of the 1930s, al most all work ers in manufactur ing, trade, and com merce, as well as in pub lic ad min is tra tion and the pro fes sions in the Philippines, were in dig e nous, which was not the case in ei ther the Eu ro pean or the Jap a nese col o nies.
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After 1901, the Dutch gov ern ment was in creas ingly concerned about liv ing stan dards in Java and ini ti ated sev eral pol i cies to in crease food pro duc tion, im prove ac cess to ed u ca tion, and en cour age mi gra tion from Java to Sumatra and Sulawesi. The Dutch were not alone in their con cern about the liv ing stan dards in their col o ny. In the early de cades of the twen ti eth cen tu ry, most co lo nial re gimes in Asia were aware of the growth of na tion al ist move ments want ing at least a greater mea sure of selfgov ern ment, if not com plete in de pen dence. By the 1920s, in the wake of the Rus sian Revolution, co lo nial re gimes had to deal with the threat of Communist in fil tra tion of in de pen dence move ments, a threat that was pres ent in the Jap a nese as well as the Eu ro pean col o nies. Colo nial sta tis ti cal agencies were established, or ex pand ed, and in di ca tors of chang ing liv ing stan dards care fully scru ti nized.
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One widely used in di ca tor was food avail abil ity per cap i ta. Although rice yields per hect are were higher in both Korea and Taiwan than in Southeast Asia, per cap ita avail abil ity of rice was lower than in sev eral parts of Southeast Asia, in clud ing Brit ish Malaya, Thailand, and French Indochina. Furthermore, the sta tis tics in di cated that rice con sump tion per cap ita fell in both Korea and Taiwan, par tic u larly dur ing the 1930s, al though in Korea the fall was con tin u ous from 1915-1919 to the 1930s. 78 The de cline in Korea was at trib uted to the in creas ing amounts of rice land un der the con trol of land lords, many of them Jap a nese. Much of the rice they grew was exported to Japan. Many Ko rean farm ers subsisted off pearl mil let, bar ley, and wheat. There 76 Ibid., Ta ble 6.4. Indonesia was a partial exception. 77 The work of the Institute of Pacific Relations was par tic u larly im por tant in car ry ing out re search on liv ing stan dards across the Pacific re gion in the 1920s and 1930s. does seem to have been some im prove ment in av er age rice avail abil ity per cap ita in the lat ter part of the 1930s, al though it was still be low the av er age for 1911-1913 (Table 7) .
In Taiwan, it has also been es ti mated that rice avail abil ity per cap ita fell steadily from the early twen ti eth cen tury on ward ( Table 7) . To com pen sate for fall ing rice con sump tion, farm ers con sumed more sweet po ta toes. HanYu Chang ar gued that the sub sti tu tion of rice for sweet po ta toes reflected rel a tive price changes rather than fall ing in comes. 79 This is supported by the ev i dence that real per cap ita con sump tion ex pen di tures in Taiwan in creased steadily from 1911-1913 to the end of the 1930s. This was also the case in Korea, al though Kimura ar gued against read ing too much into the av er age con sump tion da ta. Inequali ties in con sumer ex pen di ture al most cer tainly in creased in both Taiwan and Korea af ter 1910, al though the av er age in crease over the 1930s must have reflected some im prove ment in con sump tion stan dards for the ma jor i ty. 80 Myoong Soo Cha at tri butes much of the fall in food con sump tion in Korea in the in ter war years to a "pop u la tion ex plo sion ini ti ated by a health cam paign and ag gra vated by the in ter war ag ri cul tural de pres sion." 81 That mor tal ity dropped in both Taiwan and Korea af ter 1910 is con firmed by the data on crude death rates for both col o nies ( Table  7) . Similar de creases also oc curred in most parts of Southeast Asia, where gov ern ments tried to re duce mor tal i ty, es pe cially in fant and child mortality, through greater use of vac ci na tion and a va ri ety of pub lic health cam paigns, in clud ing bet ter ed u ca tion of moth ers in childfeed ing prac tices. In those col o nies for which we have a re li able time se ries, in fant and child mor tal i ty, as well as crude death rates, did fall af ter 1900.
82 By the late 1930s, in fant deaths per thou sand births were around 140 in the Philippines, Taiwan, and Brit ish Malaya, but higher in Java, French Indochina, and Burma. Crude death rates were also higher in both Burma and Java than in Korea and Taiwan, or in Brit ish Malaya, Thailand, and French Indochina.
The fac tors iden ti fied by Cha in the Ko rean case prob a bly also caused the fall in rice and corn avail abil ity per cap ita in the Philippines be tween 1920-1924 and 1935-1939 Although the Amer i can ad min is tra tion tried to in crease small holder ag ri cul tural pro duc tiv i ty, its pol i cies had only lim ited suc cess, while pop u la tion grew rap id ly, from an es ti mated 7.6 mil lion in 1903 to 16 mil lion in 1939. As in other parts of Asia, Fil i pi nos com pen sated for de clin ing avail abil ity of food grains by eat ing more root crops, but stud ies car ried out in the 1930s suggested that mal nu tri tion was wide spread in parts of the coun try. 83 Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the ev i dence is more mixed, al though there was some fall in rice con sump tion in both Java and Brit ish Malaya in the 1930s.
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Were the Jap a nese Col o nies More Prof it able?
An ar gu ment fre quently made by crit ics of Western co lo nial ism is that large prof its were of ten made by cap i tal ists, usu ally from the met ro pol i tan coun try, and that these were re mit ted abroad, rather than benefit ing the lo cal pop u la tions. In Southeast Asia, the most no to ri ous ex am ple of the co lo nial drain in the nineteenth cen tury was Java un der the cul ti va tion sys tem. Remittances from Java to the Netherlands amounted to at least 6 per cent of Java's GDP be tween 1835 and 1865. Most of these re mit tances took the form of con tri bu tions to the Dutch bud get. Although the bud get ary con tri bu tions fell af ter 1870, re mit tances on pri vate ac count grew from the late nineteenth cen tury on ward and were sub stan tial un til the 1930s. 85 In other col o nies in Southeast Asia, com mod ity ex port surpluses were also con sid er able and funded the out ward flow of cap i tal on the part of both large cor po ra tions and mi grant work ers. 86 Colonial of fi cials fre quently defended the repatriation of prof its on the grounds that they were a "fair return" on of ten risky in vest ments made by cap i tal ists in Europe and else where. But post co lo nial schol ars have ar gued that the prof its that ex pa tri ate firms in many parts of Southeast Asia made were larger than those made by firms in the met ro pol i tan countries or in other parts of the world. 87 To what ex tent did the drain through the bal ance of pay ments also oc cur in the Jap a nese col o nies? In the early years of the Jap a nese oc cu pa tion of Taiwan, the bal ance of pay ments was in def i cit, which was col o nies to the Jap a nese econ o my. An Amer i can study of the Jap a nese econ omy claimed that at the end of the 1920s, from a fis cal point of view, "the col o nies as a whole have thus far clearly been a li a bil ity rather than an as set." 95 In the early part of the 1930s, the pri vate sec tor in Japan looked to the col o nies, es pe cially Manchuria, for relief from slowing growth at home. In ad di tion, the need for new mar kets for con sumer goods ex ports be came more press ing as ac cess to mar kets in South and Southeast Asia and Africa was curtailed by the pro tec tion ist pol i cies of Britain, France, the Netherlands, and the United States. But de mand in Korea and Manchuria was for pro ducer goods; lo cal pop u la tions were too poor to pro vide a large mar ket for con sumer prod ucts. Even the grow ing de mand for cap i tal goods was not viewed as an un mit i gated bless ing to Japan. Louise Young quoted a speech by the pres i dent of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in 1940, pointing out that the di ver sion of plant and equip ment to Manchuria was caus ing short ages at home. 96 Bankers also complained at what were seen as ex ces sive de mands for loans in Manchuria, which were caus ing prob lems in the Jap a nese fi nan cial mar ket.
A com plete as sess ment of the costs and ben e fits of the em pire to Japan has yet to be car ried out. It is pos si ble that such an as sess ment would reach the same con clu sion as that of Lance Davis and Robert Hut tenback for the Brit ish Em pire. These au thors ar gued that the Brit ish econ omy as a whole did not ben e fit from the em pire, even if in di vid ual com pa nies did. 97 Certainly it is dif fi cult to agree with the as ser tion of Pe ter Liberman that "em pire paid hand somely for Japan, at least un til the in va sion of China in 1937."
98 Only Taiwan, with its rel a tively high per cap ita GDP, was prof it able to the mother coun try in the sense that sev eral Southeast Asian col o nies were. Korea and Manchuria re ceived con sid er able di rect gov ern ment sup port, as well as gov ern ment sub sidies to en cour age pri vate firms to in vest in min ing, manufactur ing, and ser vices. In the lon ger run the mas sive Jap a nese in vest ment in Korea and Manchuria might have paid off, but the de feat at the hands of the Allies in 1945 meant that Japan was un able to reap the ben e fits.
Conclusions
The main pur pose of this ar ti cle has been to as sem ble sta tis ti cal and other ev i dence on eco nomic and so cial de vel op ment across col o nies in East and Southeast Asia in the de cades from 1900 to 1940. Our main con clu sion is that the ar gu ment that Jap a nese pol i cies were uni formly more "de vel op men tal" than the pol i cies pur sued by other co lo nial pow ers in Southeast Asia is not al ways supported. The stron gest case for Jap a nese ex cep tion al ism can prob a bly be made for Taiwan, al though even here ac cess to postpri mary ed u ca tion was very lim it ed, and other in di ca tors of liv ing stan dards in clud ing food con sump tion and mor tal ity were lit tle dif fer ent from the Philippines and most parts of Brit ish Malaya. While it is true, as Peattie ar gued, that the Jap a nese ad min is tra tion could have trans ferred its own suc cess ful mod ern i za tion ef forts to Taiwan, in fact Jap a nese pol i cies came in creas ingly to re sem ble those in other parts of co lo nial Asia. 99 Trade with the rest of the world was se verely constrained, while that with Japan was based mainly on the ex change of ag ri cul tural prod ucts for man u fac tures. Industrialization was lim ited to ag ri cul tural processing, and for most years af ter 1910, the bal ance of pay ments was in sur plus, and sub stan tial sums were re mit ted back to Japan. Education was re stricted to pri mary school ing, and there were few op por tu ni ties for in dig e nous Taiwanese to oc cupy skilled jobs in the non ag ri cul tural sec tor. By the late 1930s per cap ita GDP in Tai wan was higher than in Indonesia, Burma, and Thailand, but prob a bly lit tle dif fer ent from the Philippines or Brit ish Malaya.
In Korea, per cap ita GDP was al most cer tainly lower than in Taiwan, and other in di ca tors in clud ing ed u ca tional at tain ment, mor tal i ty, and con sump tion ex pen di tures were also low er. While it is pos si ble that the mas sive Jap a nese in vest ment that took place in both Korea and Man churia would have paid off in the lon ger run, Japan's de feat and sub se quent po lit i cal up heav als in both these re gions wiped out much of the prog ress that oc curred dur ing the Jap a nese oc cu pa tion. But in Korea there was al ready a small class of ed u cated Ko re ans when Jap a nese co lo nial con trol was established. Given that the Jap a nese dom i nated the up per ech e lons of the civil ser vice, some chose to go into busi ness; some moved to Manchuria to pur sue com mer cial op por tu ni ties there. When the Republic of Korea was established af ter the bit ter civil war of the early 1950s, there was al ready an in dig e nous busi ness class driv ing the rapid in dus trial growth for which Korea has be come fa mous.
The Amer i cans were unique in Asia in their pol icy of en cour ag ing selfgov ern ment and even tual in de pen dence in the Philippines, which meant a much greater em pha sis on sec ond ary and ter tiary ed u ca tion than in other col o nies, whether French, Brit ish, Dutch, or Jap a nese. By the 1930s, Fil i pi nos oc cu pied al most all the posts in the civil ser vice, and many moved into pri vate busi ness and the pro fes sions. Amer i can pol icy in the Philippines has been contrasted with that of the Brit ish in Malaya. Here co lo nial of fi cials felt that the Malays had to be protected from cap i tal ism, which meant keep ing them in the tra di tional oc cu pa tions while en cour ag ing inmi gra tion from China and In dia in or der to pro vide wage la bor in es tates and mines. The Dutch shared the doubts of the Brit ish concerning the en tre pre neur ial abil i ties of in dig e nous In do ne sians and lim ited ac cess to Dutchlan guage ed u ca tion to a small num ber of In do ne sians from elite fam i lies. The French also paid lit tle at ten tion to the de vel op ment of for mal ed u ca tion.
Many stud ies of Jap a nese co lo nial pol i cies have stressed the achieve ments in build ing in fra struc ture. But here there were many sim i lar i ties with the achieve ments of the Brit ish, Dutch, and French co lo nial re gimes in other parts of Asia. In all cases, co lo nial en gi neers were able to draw on ex per tise in the met ro pol i tan countries, built up over many de cades, to con struct rail ways, roads, and ir ri ga tion works. Dutch achieve ments in Java were broadly com pa ra ble to those of the Jap a nese in Taiwan; the Dutch were able to draw on cen tu ries of ex pe ri ence in man ag ing wa ter in their home land to build largescale ir ri ga tion works, which sur vive to this day. Railway and road con struc tion was also de vel oped in both is lands, at least partly to serve the needs of ag ri cul tural processing in dus tries, es pe cially sug ar, since cane had to be transported to the mills rap idly af ter cut ting. Critics of in fra struc ture de vel op ment in co lo nial Asia have ar gued that it oc curred largely to serve the needs of in ves tors from the met ro pol i tan pow er. This was of ten the case, but it seems to be just as true in Jap a nesecon trolled re gions as else where.
We are left with a fi nal, very im por tant ques tion. If in deed it was the case that Jap a nese pol i cies were not unique in their em pha sis on eco nomic de vel op ment, then how do we ex plain the re mark able growth per for mance of Taiwan and the Republic of Korea af ter Jap a nese co lo nial ism was ended in 1945? How do we ex plain the slower pace of eco nomic growth in Indonesia, the Philippines, Burma, Vietnam, and Malaysia af ter these countries be came in de pen dent? A full an swer to these ques tions is be yond the scope of this ar ti cle. But the na ture of the de col o ni za tion pro cess was of cru cial im por tance. In sev eral cases, no ta bly Indonesia and Vietnam, in de pen dence was only con ceded af ter bit ter con flict with the Dutch and French armies. In Vietnam, the coun try was di vided into two op pos ing re gimes, which trig gered two de cades of fur ther con flict un til reunification in 1975. Elsewhere the newly in de pen dent na tions faced re gional re bel lions, of ten based on the re sent ment felt by eth nic and re li gious mi nor i ties against the cen tral gov ern ment. In Malaysia, the fed er a tion put to gether by the Brit ish lasted only two years be fore Singapore with drew to be come an in de pen dent state. Southeast Asia remained a tur bu lent re gion for more than three de cades af ter the end of the Pacific War. In seek ing to ex plain the stel lar growth of at least part of the for mer Jap a nese em pire, and the slower growth of other Asian col o nies, we must fo cus on de vel op ments af ter 1945.
